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1 Introduction
The NTRU public key cryptosystem was proposed by Hoffstein et al. in 1996 [20]. The
first version of this public key cryptosystem was standardized and published within IEEE
P1363.1 [22]. Its security is based on the hardness of finding the shortest vector problem
(SVP) and the closest vector problem (CVP) in a particular type of lattices, the convo-
lutional modular lattices [30]. Furthermore, these two lattice problems are known to be
NP-hard problems [31], [32]. Thus, NTRU is a candidate for quantum-resistant public key
cryptosystems.
The NTRU cryptosystem has been shown to be faster than RSA and elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems [18]. Indeed, the linearity of lattice operations offers speed advantages over cryp-
tosystems based on other known hard problems. Considering computational efficiency and
low cost of implementation, NTRU is one of the fastest public key cryptosystems [18].
NTRU is based on the polynomial ring R = Z[x]/〈xn − 1〉. Coppersmith and Shamir
[11] present a lattice attack against NTRU that finds the private key from its public key by
solving the SVP on the NTRU lattice. They suggest that a non-commutative algebra can
be considered for the underlying algebra to avoid these attacks. Several non-commutative
proposals have been introduced and, consequently, have been broken. Gaborit et al. [14]
introduce CTRU as an analogue to NTRU where the coefficients of polynomials are from
F2 instead of Z. Kouzmenko [25] shows that CTRU can be broken using a polynomial time
attack. Generalizations of NTRU over the Dedekind domains including Z[i], Z[
√−2], Z[ζ3]
and Z[ζ5], where ζ3 and ζ5 are 3rd and 5th roots of unity, are presented in [23] and [33] .
A non-commutative version of NTRU over the non-commutative ring of k× k matrices of
polynomials in the ring R is also available in the literature [9]. Another non-commutative
version of NTRU, called QTRU, is addressed by Malekian et al. over quaternion algebras
[28], [29]. The computational processes of QTRU have high complexity and at equivalent
parameters set, QTRU is slower that NTRU. In a different direction, Caboara et al. [7] in-
crease the number of variables in the polynomial ring R, instead of operating in a different
coefficient ring. Moreover, they introduce an ideal of R in their scheme so to complicate the
attacking scenarios of NTRU-like cryptosystem. However, this scheme is inefficient due to
the high complexity of the key generation, the encryption and the decryption algorithms. An
improvement of this work is presented for bilinear polynomial rings in [4], which is secure
against the lattice based attack and has an efficient encryption algorithm but its key gener-
ation and decryption algorithm are still not efficient enough to be practical. The proposed
method in this paper, inspired by [4] and [28], leads to an efficient NTRU-like cryptosystem
that is secure against lattice based attacks in smaller dimensions.
There are other advantages and practical potentialities when using non-commutative
structures like quaternions as the underlying ring of NTRU. On the one hand, many appli-
cations in image processing are concerned with signals and images that have three or four
dimensional samples. Quaternions are useful tools for modeling and analyzing such sig-
nals that arise very naturally in the physical world from the three dimensions of physical
space to trichromatic nature of human color vision. More generally, the four dimensions of
quaternions can be used to represent a most general set of geometric operations in three
dimensions using homogenous coordinates. The reader is pointed to the recent book [13]
that shows quaternions usages in signal and image processing. Given this number of appli-
cations of quaternions, looking at scenarios that require secure data transmission of a source
that generates vector-valued samples, leads us to design a fast cryptosystem based on quater-
nions. On the other hand, under special conditions, quaternion algebras over a field F are
isomorphic toM2(F), the ring of 2×2 matrices over F. In this case, the multiplication of two
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elements of these quaternion algebras is equivalent to a multiplication of their corresponding
2×2 matrices over F. Strassen shows that two 2×2 matrices can be multiplied using only
seven multiplications and some additions [38]. Thus, any quaternion multiplication can be
done with 7 multiplications over F instead of 16. Therefore, if we use the special case of
quaternion algebra in a cryptosystem, it leads to low complexity encryption and decryption
algorithms due to the high speed operations in this algebra. This also motivated us to present
an extensions of NTRU cryptosystem over quaternions.
In this paper, we introduce an NTRU-like cryptosystem called BQTRU. We change the
underlying algebraic structure of NTRU to a quaternion algebra over the bivariate polyno-
mial ring R′ =Z[x,y]/〈xn−1,yn−1〉. In BQTRU, four messages from four different sources
are encrypted at the same time; this is useful in multiuser applications. Moreover, the pro-
cessing in the BQTRU cryptosystem is fast thanks to several quaternion properties.
Similar to [4] and [7], we use an ideal of R′ when designing the BQTRU cryptosystem
to enhance the security of our proposed NTRU-like cryptosystem against lattice attacks.
Therefore, the BQTRU lattice also has a hybrid structure that makes inefficient standard
lattice attacks on the private key. Hence, the lattice based attacks on our private key have
higher complexity than other NTRU-like cryptosystems. As a consequence of some special
properties, BQTRU is more resistant than other NTRU-like cryptosystems against lattice
based attacks in smaller dimensions. Typically, we can obtain the same security level of other
NTRU-like cryptosystems but here in lower dimensions. This high complexity of lattice
based attacks opens the possibility of smaller key sizes and more message protection with
respect to NTRU.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the original presentation of
the NTRU cryptosystem and required mathematical background about quaternion algebras
are revisited. The design of the proposed cryptosystem is presented in Section 3. In Section
4, we present the choice of parameters for BQTRU which makes the probability of decryp-
tion failure to be close to negligible. In Section 5, the security analysis of the proposed
cryptosystem against known attacks on both the public key and the message are discussed.
Using the parameters presented in the previous section, the size of the key space and mes-
sage space of BQTRU is compared with NTRU and QTRU. We also design a lattice based
attack on BQTRU and we show that BQTRU is resistant against this attack. Conclusions are
given in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The NTRU cryptosystem
In this section, we briefly describe the original NTRU public key cryptosystem; for more
information, see [19], [20]. We follow the presentation in [20]. We start by fixing an in-
teger n > 1 and two coprime moduli p and q with q ≫ p. Commonly n is chosen to be
prime and p is chosen to be 3. Let R = Z[x]/〈xn−1〉 be the ring of truncated polynomials
with convolutional multiplication denoted by the symbol ∗. In this ring, the addition of two
polynomials is defined by the pairwise addition of the coefficients. We consider the rings
Rq = Zq[x]/〈xn−1〉 and Rp = Zp[x]/〈xn−1〉 and the subsets L f , Lg, Lr and Lm of R. The
set L f (respectively, Lg and Lr) contains ternary polynomials, that is polynomials with coef-
ficients +1 and −1, in R with 2d f (respectively, 2dg and 2dr ) monomials with coefficients
±1, and the set Lm contains polynomials in R whose coefficients are between −(p− 1)/2
and (p−1)/2. In NTRU the usual choice is d f = dg = dr = d approximately of size n/3. For
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correctness of the decryption algorithm in NTRU, we concentrate on polynomials of small
norm, compared to the modulus q. We use the term “small” polynomial to indicate polyno-
mials in R having small norm compared to the modulus q. Specially in the original NTRU,
small polynomials are those ternary polynomials such that many coefficients are zero and
the rest (2d ≈ 2n/3) are in the set {1,−1}. The usage of these type of polynomials is key
for NTRU security.
Using public parameters n, p and q, NTRU key generation selects two small random
polynomials f ∈ L f and g ∈ Lg such that f is invertible in Rq and Rp. The inverses of f in
Rq and Rp are denoted by f
−1
q and f
−1
p , respectively.
The public key is h= f−1q ∗g (mod q).
The private key is ( f ,g).
To encrypt a message m from the set of messages Lm, we pick a random polynomial
r ∈ Lr and compute
c= ph∗ r+m (mod q).
To decrypt a ciphertext c, we use the private key f and compute
e= f ∗ c= f ∗ (ph∗ r+m) = p f ∗ ( f−1q ∗g)∗ r+ f ∗m= pg∗ r+ f ∗m (mod q).
We can ensure that all of the coefficients of pg∗ r+ f ∗m fall in the interval [− q−1
2
, q−1
2
] by
a careful choice of parameters. Thus, e∈ Rq is equal to pg∗r+ f ∗m ∈ R and the message m
is obtained from e by reducing the coefficients of f−1p ∗ e modulo p. The public parameters
(n, p,q) of NTRU are chosen such that the probability of decryption failure is minimized. If
q> (6d+1)p, then the decryption process never fails [20].
There are several known attacks on NTRU which are classified in two types of attacks:
combinatorial and lattice based attacks. The combinatorial attacks are easily avoided by a
careful choice of parameters [21]; the lattice based attacks are the most significant attacks
to date and lead to the more recent developments of NTRU [11]. Coppersmith and Shamir
introduced the NTRU lattice as a submodule L of R×R generated by (q,0) and (1,h).
When we represent the elements of R by their coefficient vectors in Zn, the submodule L
can also be viewed as a 2n-dimensional lattice LNTRU with row basis matrix[
qI 0
H I
]
,
where H is a circulant n×n matrix defined by the coefficient vector of h as first row, and
each additional row is obtained from the one above it by cyclic shifting one position to the
right. An attempt at finding the private key ( f ,g) leads to solving SVP in LNTRU [11], while
an attempt at obtaining the message m leads to finding CVP in LNTRU [20]. Lattice basis
reduction algorithms like LLL [26] and BKZ [35] (or BKZ 2.0 [8]) can find SVP in an n
dimensional lattice Λ ⊆ Rn with length up to a factor of at most 2O(n) the size of a shortest
vector in Λ . Therefore, when n gets sufficiently large the algorithms fail to determine a
suitable result for SVP. Thus the dimension of the lattice must be large enough in order to
have a reasonable level of security in the cryptosystem.
2.2 Quaternion algebra
In this section, we briefly review quaternion algebras which contain the underlying algebra
of our proposed cryptosystem as a special case. Hamilton discovered the real quaternion
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algebra H in 1843. It is known that the only real normed division algebras are R, C, H and
the Octonions O [10], where the normed division algebras are not necessarily commutative
or associative. Among the above algebras, H is the only one that is associative and non-
commutative. The real quaternions can be considered as a vector space of dimension 4 over
R with an ordered basis {1, i, j,k} as follows
H= {s0+ s1i+ s2 j+ s3k | s0,s1,s2,s3 ∈ R}.
The addition of two quaternions and the scalar multiplication are defined by component-wise
vector addition and scalar multiplication. The multiplication of two quaternions denoted by
◦ is defined by the following rules:
i2 = j2 = k2 =−1, i◦ j =− j ◦ i= k, j ◦ k=−k ◦ j = i, k ◦ i=−i◦ k = j.
We define quaternion algebras over general fields whose characteristic are not 2. Some of
the basic properties of these algebras are derived using straightforward computational argu-
ments.
Definition 1 Let a and b be non-zero elements of a field F. The quaternion algebra A over
F is a four dimensional F-space with basis 1, i, j and k, where the bilinear multiplication is
defined by the conditions that 1 is a unity element, and
i2 = a, j2 = b, i◦ j =− j ◦ i= k.
Therefore
k2 =−ab, j ◦ k =−k ◦ j =−ib, k ◦ i=−i◦ k =− ja
and A is an associative algebra over F.
For each quaternion s = s0 + s1i+ s2 j+ s3k in A, its conjugate is given by s¯ = s0 −
s1i− s2 j− s3k, and its norm is defined by N(s) = s ◦ s¯ = s¯ ◦ s = s20− as21− bs22+ abs23. A
quaternion is a unit quaternion if its norm is 1. The inverse of the quaternion s is given by
s−1 = s¯/N(s) = s¯◦ (N(s))−1 provided that its norm is nonzero.
The constructed algebra is denoted by
(
a,b
F
)
as a (generalized) quaternion algebra over
F. Hamilton’s quaternions occur as the special case H =
(
−1,−1
R
)
. It is well known that(
a,b
F
)
is a four-dimensional associative algebra with central field F.
A quaternion algebra over F is either a division algebra or else is isomorphic to M2(F).
In [27], it is shown that for any field F,
M2(F)∼=
(1,1
F
)
,
where the isomorphism is induced by
i=
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, j =
[
0 1
1 0
]
.
The Lipschitz quaternions or integral quaternions L =
(
a,b
Z
)
form a subring of the real
quaternions H. The algebra Lq =
(
a,b
Fq
)
is defined over the finite field Fq, where q is a prime
number.
In general, the quaternion algebra A can be defined over any commutative ring R with
identity. In this paper, we define the quaternion algebra over the polynomial ring R′ =
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Z[x,y]/〈xn− 1,yn− 1〉, where we can perform arithmetic operations efficiently, low com-
plexity and low memory requirements.
When we work with fields like the complex numbers, we have efficient algorithms for
solving the equations with coefficients belonging to this field. In the quaternions, some prob-
lems like root finding algorithms, even solving a quadratic equation with coefficients be-
longing to H, become nontrivial. Kalantari in [24] suggests a new and simple approach for
computing the solutions of a quadratic polynomial in H[x]. We remark that even quadratic
equations where the variable and the coefficients may not commute are fairly complicated
to solve.
Factoring a polynomial in R[x] where R is noncommutative does not preserve evalua-
tion, that is, given P,E,H ∈ R[x], the evaluation of the polynomials at r ∈ R is not a ring
homomorphism. That is,
P(x) = E(x)H(x) does not imply P(r) = E(r)H(r).
Example 1 Consider P(x) = (x− i)(x− j)∈H[x]. We might expect i and j to be roots of P.
However, P(x) = x2− (i+ j)x+ k. and hence
P(i) = i2− (i+ j)◦ i+ k =−1− i2− i◦ j+ k = 2k 6= 0,
P( j) = j2− (i+ j)◦ j+ k=−1− i◦ j− j2+ k = 0.
Therefore, j is a (right) root of P, but i is not.
Definition 2 ([24]) Two quaternions s and s′ are congruent or equivalent, denoted by s∼ s′,
if for some quaternion w 6= 0 we have, s′ = w ◦ s ◦w−1. The congruence class of s = s0+
s1i+ s2 j+ s3k, denoted by [s], is the set
[s] =
{
s′ ∈ H | s′ ∼ s} .
It is proved in [24] that [s] =
{
s0+ x1i+ x2 j+ x3k | x21+ x22+ x23 = s21+ s22+ s23
}
.
Definition 3 ([24]) Let R be a noncommutative ring. An element r ∈ R is a right root of a
nonzero polynomial P∈R[x] if and only if P(x)=E(x)(x−r) for some polynomial E ∈R[x].
Theorem 1 ([24]) Let D be a division ring, and let P(x) = E(x)H(x) with P,E,H ∈ D[x].
An element d ∈ D is a root of P if and only if either d is a root of H, or a conjugate of d is a
root of E.
The fact that the evaluation map over the quaternions does not define a ring homomorphism
from H[x] to H, is a source of difficulty in polynomial root-finding over the quaternions. On
the other hand, in contrast with real or complex polynomials, a quaternion polynomial can
have infinitely many roots or it could have fewer roots than its degree without multiplicity.
This arises from the following theorem.
Theorem 2 ([16]) Let D be a division ring. A polynomial in D[x] of degree m can have
infinitely many roots, however these roots come from at most m distinct conjugacy classes
of D.
Amethod has been presented for approximating the zeros of a real quaternion polynomial in
[24]. Moreover, a simple method for constructing a quaternion polynomial with prescribed
zeros and a decomposition theorem for a quaternion polynomial in H[x] is also described in
[24].
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The proposed cryptosystem in this paper requires the study of quaternion algebras over
commutative ring R′ = Z[x,y]/〈xn−1,yn−1〉. Factorization, decomposition and classifica-
tion of zeros of a quaternion polynomial in this ring have not been addressed in the literature
as far we know.
One of the important structures in our cryptosystem is the ideal J of A, quaternion
algebra over R′, which we introduce in the next section. The key generation process involves
finding the inverse of a polynomial F = f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k ∈ A modulo the ideal J which
requires an efficient division algorithm in general. Due to the lack of such algorithm in the
literature, we consider a special form for ideal J that makes the existence of a quaternion
division algorithm inessential for us. We consider J = Q+Qi+Q j+Qk, where the ideal
Q is a central ideal of A, that is Q ⊆ Z(A), where Z(A) is the center of A, that is, the set
of all elements in A that commute with every element. The construction method of Q and J
is also presented in the next section. It is related to the choice of a set containing n-th roots
of unity, roots of the polynomial xn−1 in A. Our construction method for ideal J considers
only central roots of xn−1. If this restriction could be removed and non-central roots in the
construction of J could be used, then Theorem 2 would provide enhanced security to our
system by improving the resistance to a brute force attack on the private ideal J.
3 BQTRU: a cryptosystem based on bivariate polynomials and quaternions
In this section, we introduce our cryptosystem by using the quaternion algebras as its
underlying algebraic structure. Operations in this cryptosystem are performed in the ring
of bivariate polynomials R′ = Z[x,y]/〈xn1 − 1,yn2 − 1〉. It is possible to take two differ-
ent exponents n1 and n2, however for simplicity we consider n1 = n2 = n in the rest of
the paper. We consider an order on monomials, like lexicographical order, embedding ev-
ery polynomial f ∈ R′ in Zn2 . This embedding maps a polynomial f ∈ R′ into a vector−→
f = ( f0, f1, . . . , fn2−1) ∈ Zn
2
.
We choose the public parameters (n, p,q) similar to the original NTRU: n is a prime
number, p and q are two different prime numbers such that gcd(p,q) = gcd(n,q) = 1 where
q≫ p and L f ,Lg,Lφ and Lm are subsets of R′ that are defined similar to their corresponding
subsets in NTRU. In the proposed cryptosystem, the integers d f , dg, dφ and dm associated
to these subsets are considered such that d f = dg = dφ = dm = d ≈ n2/7. An additional
condition is the choice of n and q such that n|(q−1).
We choose an ideal Qq of R
′
q = Zq[x,y]/〈xn−1,yn−1〉 and use this ideal for key gen-
eration and decryption in our cryptosystem. In the next section, we show that the use of
this ideal leads to applying a different lattice for decryption. Since 〈xn− 1,yn− 1〉 ⊂ Qq,
therefore Qq corresponds to the intersection of ideals of the form 〈x−a,y−b〉 where (a,b)
belongs to the set E = {(a,b) ∈ Zq×Zq | an = 1,bn = 1}. Let T ⊂ E be the set of points for
which there is at least one polynomial in Qq with no roots from T . Then, it is clear that the
ideal Qq is equal to the set of polynomials that vanish on E\T .
The condition n|(q−1) yields the factorization of xn−1 into linear factors in Zq. Then,
E is a set of elements of Zq×Zq with cardinality n2.
Obviously, R′q is a vector space of dimension n2 over Zq where we can consider the
Lagrange basis with Lagrange interpolants defined for each point (a,b) of E by
λa,b(x,y) =
ab(xn−1)(yn−1)
n2(x−a)(y−b) . (1)
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Any polynomial f (x,y) of R′q can be identified by its values over E as [3]
f (x,y) = ∑
(a,b)∈E
f (a,b)∗λa,b(x,y). (2)
For each (a,b) ∈ E, the Lagrange interpolant λa,b(x,y) is a polynomial that vanishes on E
except at (a,b) where its value is equal to 1. Moreover, every λa,b(x,y) have the property
that for each α ∈ R′q
α(x,y)∗λa,b(x,y) = α(a,b)∗λa,b(x,y). (3)
In this way, when we see R′q as a vector space over Zq, then Qq can be consider as a vector
subspace of R′q. Since any polynomial ρ ∈ Qq vanishes outside of T , by considering (2),
we have ρ(x,y) = ∑(a,b)∈T ρ(a,b)∗λa,b(x,y). Without loss of generality, we assume that the
first |T | elements of the set E are exactly the points of T . Hence, each ρ ∈Qq is written as a
linear combination of {λai,bi(x,y)}|T |i=1 and this set can be a basis of Qq as a vector subspace
of R′q.
On the other hand, Qq, as an ideal, can be generated by
σ (x,y) = ∑
|T |
i=1
qiλai,bi(x,y), (4)
where for i = 1, . . . , |T |, qi is a nonzero element of Zq chosen at random, or given by any
other polynomial which does not vanish on T . We observe that σ (x,y)∗λai,bi(x,y)(qi)−1 =
λai,bi(x,y) for i = 0, . . . , |T |, therefore the ideal generated by σ (x,y) contains our basis for
the vector space Qq. Consequently, we can consider Qq = 〈σ (x,y)〉. In this way, the ideal
Q= 〈q,σ (x,y)〉 of R′ has {q}∪{λai ,bi(x,y)}|T |i=1 as its generators, where T ⊆ E.
In our cryptosystem, we consider the quaternion algebras A, Ap and Aq over the rings
R′ =Z[x,y]/〈xn−1,yn−1〉, R′p =Zp[x,y]/〈xn−1,yn−1〉 and R′q =Zq[x,y]/〈xn−1,yn−1〉,
respectively:
A=
(1,1
R′
)
=
{
f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k
∣∣ f0, f1, f2, f3 ∈ R′; i2 = j2 = 1, i◦ j =− j ◦ i= k},
Ap =
(1,1
R′p
)
=
{
f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k
∣∣ f0, f1, f2, f3 ∈ R′p; i2 = j2 = 1, i◦ j =− j ◦ i= k},
Aq =
(1,1
R′q
)
=
{
f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k
∣∣ f0, f1, f2, f3 ∈ R′q; i2 = j2 = 1, i◦ j =− j ◦ i= k},
which are isomorphic to M2(R
′), M2(R′p) and M2(R′q), respectively. These quaternion alge-
bras possess the properties seen in Section 2, except that some nonzero elements might have
zero norm and then such elements do not have a multiplicative inverse [10].
The multiplication of two quaternions F and G of these quaternion algebras is equiv-
alent to a multiplication of two 2× 2-matrices over their underlying ring. For example, a
quaternion F = f0 + f1i+ f2 j+ f3k ∈ A is isomorphic to a 2× 2-matrix in M2(R′) with
generators
i=
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, j =
[
0 1
1 0
]
.
Therefore, since i j = k, we obtain
F = f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k ∼= f0
[
1 0
0 1
]
+ f1
[
1 0
0 −1
]
+ f2
[
0 1
1 0
]
+ f3
[
0 1
−1 0
]
∼=
[
f0+ f1 f2+ f3
f2− f3 f0− f1
]
.
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Strassen [38] shows that two 2× 2 matrices can be multiplied using only seven multipli-
cations. An improvement on Strassen’s algorithm for 2×2 matrices is given by Winograd
[40]. More information about Strassen’s algorithm and its variants is available in [6] (page
11-13). Hence, the multiplication of two quaternions F and G of A is equivalent to a multi-
plication of their equivalent 2×2-matrices over the the ring R′. Thus, this multiplication is
possible with 7 convolutional multiplications in R′ and some additional sums.
In the following we present some lemmas and a theorem that are needed for the key
generation of our cryptosystem. The proof of some lemmas is trivial and they are left to the
reader. Without loss of generality, we assume that the points are ordered such that the first
|T | points are exactly the points of the subset T .
Lemma 1 Let ρ :Aq → (Lq)n2 be a map defined by
ρ(F) = (F(a1,b1),F(a2,b2), . . . ,F(an2 ,bn2)),
where (ai,bi)∈ E and Lq =
(
1,1
Zq
)
is the algebra of quaternions over Zq. Then the following
properties hold
ρ(F+G) = ρ(F)+ρ(G),
ρ(F ◦G) = ρ(F)•ρ(G),
where
ρ(F)•ρ(G) = (F(a1,b1)◦G(a1,b1),F(a2,b2)◦G(a2,b2), . . . ,F(an2 ,bn2 )◦G(an2 ,bn2)).
Proof Considering Equation (2) and (3), the following relationship holds:
F(x,y) =
n2
∑
i=1
F(ai,bi)◦λai,bi(x,y),
F ◦G =
( n2
∑
i=1
F(ai,bi)◦λai,bi(x,y)
)
◦G=
n2
∑
i=1
F(ai,bi)◦G◦λai,bi(x,y)
=
n2
∑
i=1
(
F(ai,bi)◦G(ai,bi)
)◦λai ,bi(x,y).
We observed that since λai,bi(x,y) ∈ Zq[x,y] commutes with G, the second equation holds.
Therefore,
ρ(F ◦G) = (F(a1,b1)◦G(a1,b1),F(a2,b2)◦G(a2,b2), . . . ,F(an2 ,bn2)◦G(an2 ,bn2 ))
= ρ(F)•ρ(G).

Lemma 2 Let Aq = R
′
q + R
′
qi+ R
′
q j+ R
′
qk and let Bq = Zq[x,y] +Zq[x,y]i+Zq[x,y] j+
Zq[x,y]k. Then
Aq
∼= Bq〈xn−1,yn−1〉 =
Zq[x,y]+Zq[x,y]i+Zq[x,y] j+Zq[x,y]k
〈xn−1,yn−1〉 .
Lemma 3 Let Jq = Qq+Qqi+Qq j+Qqk, where Qq is the ideal of R
′
q generated by σ =
∑
|T |
i=1 qiλai,bi(x,y). Then Jq is an ideal of Aq and is generated by σ . Furthermore, Jq contains
the ideal 〈xn−1,yn−1〉 of Bq.
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In a similar way, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let J =Q+Qi+Q j+Qk, where Q= 〈σ ,q〉 is an ideal of R′. Then, J is an ideal
of A= R′+R′i+R′ j+R′k and is generated by q and σ , that is J = 〈q,σ 〉A.
Lemma 5 Let J = Q+Qi+Q j+Qk and A= R′+R′i+R′ j+R′k. Then
A
J
∼= R
′
Q
+
R′
Q
i+
R′
Q
j+
R′
Q
k.
Corollary 1 The computation of F = f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k ∈A modulo J is equivalent to the
computation of fi modulo Q, for i= 0, . . . ,3.
In the following, we recall the combinatorial nullstellensatz theorem.
Theorem 3 (Combinatorial Nullstellensatz) Let F be an arbitrary field, and let f = f (x1,
. . . ,xn) be a polynomial in F [x1, . . . ,xn]. Suppose the degree of f is ∑
n
i=1 ti, where each ti
is a nonnegative integer and suppose the coefficient of ∏ni=1 x
ti
i in f is nonzero. Then, if
U1, . . . ,Un are subsets of F with | Ui |> ti, there are a1 ∈U1,a2 ∈U2, . . . ,an ∈ Un so that
f (a1, . . . ,an) 6= 0.
Remark 1 In accordance with the Combinatorial Nullstellensatz theorem [2], for any set of
T ⊆ E, there is a unique polynomial σ (x,y) that generates Q.
Proof Let T ′ and T be two subsets of E that generate the same polynomial σ (x,y). With-
out loss of generality assume that the points are ordered such that the first |T | (or |T ′|)
points are exactly the points of the subset T (or T ′). Equation (4) implies that σ (x,y) =
∑
|T |
i=1 qiλai,bi(x,y) = ∑
|T ′|
i=1 qiλai,bi(x,y) and k(x,y) = ∑
|T |
i=1 qiλai,bi(x,y)−∑|T
′|
i=1 qiλai,bi(x,y) =
0. According to the Combinatorial Nullstellensatz theorem, since the degree of k is 2(n−1)
andU1 =U2 = {b∈Zq | bn = 1}, where the condition n|(q−1) yields |U1 |=|U2 |= n, there
are a ∈U1,b ∈U2 so that k(a,b) 6= 0. However k(x,y) = 0, and this contradiction completes
the proof. 
In this cryptosystem, we choose a set T ⊆ E such that the cardinality of this set is small.
Then, we construct the ideal Q = 〈q,σ (x,y)〉 of R′. We consider J = Q+Qi+Q j+Qk as
the private ideal of A and use it for key generation and decryption. In the next subsection,
we explain how to choose the subset T .
By considering a monomial basis for R′, we get that R′ is isomorphic toZn2 as an additive
modulo over Z. Since Q is an ideal of R′, then Q⊂ R′ ∼= Zn2 is an additive subgroup of Zn2
and so Q can be viewed as an n2 dimensional lattice, denoted by ΛQ, in Z
n2 . Similarly,
when we specify a basis for A, we get that A is isomorphic to Zn
2
+Zn
2
i+Zn
2
j+Zn
2
k
that is also isomorphic to Z4n
2
as an additive group. The private ideal J is an ideal of A =
R′+R′i+R′ j+R′k and J ⊂ A ∼= Z4n2 can be viewed also as a lattice in Z4n2 . We use this
private lattice, denoted by Λprivate, in our cryptosystem.
To construct a generator matrix for the private lattice Λprivate, we first give a generator
matrix for the lattice ΛQ and develop it for Λprivate. In the following, we give the generator
matrix of the lattice ΛQ.
Let D′ be the generator matrix of ΛQ. Then, D′ is an n2 × n2 matrix whose rows are
coefficient vectors of the Lagrange interpolants {λai,bi}|T |i=1 and some qe ji ’s to be explained
next, where ji ∈ S⊆ {1, . . . ,n2}, for i= 1, . . . ,n and ek is the vector with one in k-th position
and zero in other positions. Consider the matrix L whose rows are the coefficient vectors of
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the Lagrange interpolants {λa1 ,b1 , . . . ,λa|T |,b|T |}. Using that the row rank of an integer matrix
is equal to its column rank [5] (see Chapter 4), the row rank and column rank of L is |T |. We
can assume that the columns i1, . . . , i|T | are independent columns in this matrix L. Let
S := { j1, . . . , jn2−|T |}= {1, . . . ,n2}\{i1, . . . , i|T |},
where j1 < j2 < · · · < jn2−|T |. Then, qe j1 . . . ,qe jn2−|T | and the coefficient vectors of inter-
polants {λai,bi}|T |i=1 form a basis for ΛQ with high probability. Now, since J ∼= Q4 as additive
groups, the private lattice Λprivate is generated by the rows of the following matrix
Mprivate =


D′ 0 0 0
0 D′ 0 0
0 0 D′ 0
0 0 0 D′

 . (5)
3.1 Key generation
For creating public and private keys, we randomly choose two quaternion polynomials F
and G in A as
F = f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k, f0, f1, f3, f4 ∈ L f ,
G = g0+g1i+g2 j+g3k, g0,g1,g3,g4 ∈ Lg.
The polynomials fi ∈ L f and gi ∈ Lg, for i = 0, . . . ,3, are small ternary polynomials in R′,
that is, they are random polynomials that most coefficients are zero and the rest are in the set
{1,−1}. Therefore, the two quaternion polynomials F and G are small ternary quaternion
polynomials. If we consider the coefficient vector of each element F = f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k∈
A as
−→
F = (
−→
f0 ,
−→
f1 ,
−→
f2 ,
−→
f3)
then, the coefficient vectors of
−→
F and
−→
G have many zeros and few 1 and −1. Therefore, the
Euclidean norm of
−→
F and
−→
G is small.
Both F and G should be invertible in A/J, that is, there exist F−1 and G−1 in A such
that
F ◦F−1 = F−1 ◦F = 1 (mod J),
G◦G−1 = G−1 ◦G= 1 (mod J).
The quaternion F must satisfy the additional requirement that it is invertible in Ap for de-
cryption purpose. In order for the quaternion F to be invertible over Ap, the polynomial
N(F) = f 20 − f 21 − f 22 − f 23 must be nonzero and invertible over its underlying ring R′p.
By Lemma 5, A/J is a quaternion algebra over the ring R′/Q. Hence, the necessary and
sufficient condition for invertibility of F and G in A/J is the existence of (N(F))−1 and
(N(G))−1 in the ring R′/Q.
In the sequel, we present a method for choosing F and G to fulfill the above conditions.
Our method uses the fact that the polynomial N(F) is invertible modulo Q if and only if the
roots of N(F) which belong to E are also contained in T . Thus our method selects T after
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choosing F and G to make sure that N(F) and N(G) are invertible modulo Q: choose G at
random and define the set T =
⋂3
i=0{(a,b) ∈ E | gi(a,b) = 0}. If T = /0, then pick another
G. Select F randomly such that {(a,b) ∈ E | N(F)(a,b) = 0} ⊂ T .
The inverses of the quaternion F in A/J and Ap are denoted by F
−1 and F−1p , respec-
tively; they are computed as follows
F−1 = ( f 20 + f
2
1 + f
2
2 + f
2
3 )
−1 ◦ F¯ = l0+ l1i+ l2 j+ l3k; l0, l1, l2, l3 ∈ R′/Q
F−1p = ( f
2
0 + f
2
1 + f
2
2 + f
2
3 )
−1 ◦ F¯ = s0+ s1i+ s2 j+ s3k; s0,s1,s2,s3 ∈ R′p.
A necessary issue in public key generation is to choose a quaternionW = w0+w1 · i+w2 ·
j+w3 · k in Lq =
(
1,1
Zq
)
, such that W be invertible over Lq and w0,w1,w2,w3 6= 0. This
quaternion prevents the leakage of public key information. Then we compute H˜ = F−1 ◦
G+ϑ (mod q) where F ◦F−1 = F−1 ◦F = 1 (mod J) and ϑ =W ◦σ ∈ Jq is unknown to
the attacker. The quaternion
H˜ = F−1 ◦G+ϑ (mod q), (6)
is the public key in our cryptosystem. The modulo q operation is componentwise, it means
that the corresponding quaternion of F−1 ◦G+ϑ in Aq that is (h0(modq)) + (h1(mod
q))i+(h2(modq)) j+(h3(modq))k is considered as the public key H˜ . The coefficient vec-
tors
−−−−−−→
hi(modq)’s, for i= 0, . . . ,3, denote the public key H˜ . Therefore, the memory needed to
store the public key H˜ is equal to 4n2⌈log2 q⌉ bits.
We have that F ◦F−1 = F−1 ◦F = 1+α ◦σ (mod q), where α ∈ A is unknown to the
attacker. Therefore, multiplying Equation (6) by F implies that
F ◦ H˜ = F ◦F−1 ◦G+F ◦ϑ (mod q)
= (1+α ◦σ )◦G+F ◦ϑ (mod q)
= G+σ ◦α ◦G+F ◦ϑ (mod q)
= G+ γ (mod q).
Thus,
F ◦ H˜ = G+ γ (mod q), (7)
γ = σ ◦α ◦G+F ◦ϑ , (8)
where γ ∈ Jq. Subsequently, the private key consists of (−→G ,−→F ,−
−−→
ρ(γ)), where
−−→
ρ(γ) =(
ρ(γ0), . . . ,ρ(γ3)
)
.
Using Lemma 1, we have
ρ(σ ) =
(
q1, . . . ,q|T |,0, . . . ,0
)
, (9)
ρ(G) =
(
0, . . . ,0,G(a|T |+1,b|T |+1), . . . ,G(an2 ,bn2)
)
, (10)
ρ(ϑ ) =
(
q1W, . . . ,q|T |W,0, . . . ,0
)
. (11)
Therefore,
ρ(γ) = ρ(σ ◦α ◦G)+ρ(F ◦ϑ )
= (0, . . . ,0)+ρ(F ◦ϑ )
= ρ(F ◦ϑ ). (12)
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3.2 Encryption
To encrypt the incoming data m, we convert it into a quaternion having four small poly-
nomials. We map m to a quaternion M = m0+m1i+m2 j+m3k ∈ A, where mi ∈ Lm, for
i = 0, . . . ,3. The incoming data can be generated from the same or four different sources.
Then, the data is transformed into the quaternionM. After that, we pick a random quaternion
Φ = φ0+φ1i+φ2 j+φ3k such that φi ∈ Lφ , for i= 0, . . . ,3. The encrypted message is
C = pH˜ ◦Φ +M (mod q).
In this cryptosystem we can set up to four messages at once and encrypt them simultaneously
as one quaternion and transmit it as the ciphertext. Encryption and key generation need one
quaternion multiplication including 16 convolution multiplications but we show that the
multiplication of two quaternions of Aq is equivalent to a multiplication of their equivalent
2× 2-matrices over the the ring R′q. Moreover, by Strassen method [38] the multiplication
of two quaternions is possible with only 7 convolutional multiplications.
Since each quaternion in our cryptosystem is a 4-tuple vector of integers and since we
use bivariate polynomials, an instance of BQTRUwith the parameters (n, p,q) is comparable
with an instance of NTRU with the public parameters (4n2, p,q). We believe this is a fair
comparison between NTRU and our system.
We note that the number of multiplication operations in a convolutional product of two
polynomials using standard arithmetic with degree n− 1 is equal to n2. Therefore, if we
consider NTRU with the public parameters (4n2, p,q), the number of multiplication op-
erations in encryption and key generation is (4n2)2 = 16n4. While, the multiplication of
two quaternions in our encryption and key generation process needs only 7 convolutional
multiplications in R′q. Therefore, the number of multiplication operations in key generation
and encryption of our cryptosystem with dimension n is 7n4. Hence, if we apply Strassen
method in our cryptosystem, the key generation and encryption process is 16/7 times faster
than NTRU with dimension comparable parameters.
3.3 Decryption
Let C ∈ Aq be the received ciphertext. In order to decrypt it, a receiver first computes
F ◦C (mod q).
Then she finds the closest vector B to F ◦C in the private lattice Λprivate. If we choose the
public parameters carefully, thenV = F ◦C−B is a quaternion with integer coefficients, and
the receiver recovers the message by computing
F−1p ◦V (mod q).
The decryption works since
F ◦C = F ◦ (pH˜ ◦Φ +M) (mod q)
= pF ◦ H˜ ◦Φ +F ◦M (mod q)
= p(G+ γ)◦Φ +F ◦M (mod q)
= pG◦Φ + pγ ◦Φ +F ◦M (mod q)
= pG◦Φ +F ◦M+(pγ ◦Φ + εq)
= pG◦Φ +F ◦M+B,
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where ε ∈ A and B = (pα ◦G ◦Φ + pF ◦W ◦Φ) ◦σ + εq ∈ J is unknown to the receiver.
The quaternion pG◦Φ +F ◦M ∈Aq should be found in order to make the process feasible.
To this end, we find B ∈ J and after that we subtract it from F ◦C = pG ◦Φ +F ◦M+B.
Then, the process continues in the same fashion as in the NTRU decryption method.
Considering the vector representation, we have
−−−→
F ◦C =−−−−−−−−−−→pG◦Φ +F ◦M+−→B . We show
that
−→
B ∈ Λprivate, is the closest vector of Λprivate to −−−→F ◦C: the vector −→B is a integer linear
combination of the rows of the generator matrix Mprivate which consist of some of
−→
λa,b’s.
We observe that, the polynomials λa,b have many monomials with large coefficients. So, the
Euclidean norm of the vectors
−→
λa,b and
−→
B (as integer linear combination of
−→
λa,b’s) is very
large. Moreover, since F ,G, Φ andM are small ternary quaternion polynomials, that is, they
have few coefficients that are equal to 1 and −1, the Euclidean norm of −→F ,−→G ,−→Φ and −→M is
small. Therefore, the Euclidean norm
−−−−−−−−−−→
pG◦Φ +F ◦M is very small relative to the Euclidean
norm of
−→
B . Thus, treating
−−−−−−−−−−→
pG◦Φ +F ◦M as a noise, −−−→F ◦C can be viewed as a perturbed
lattice point
−→
B with small noise vector and
−→
B is, with high probability, the closest vector of
Λprivate to
−−−→
F ◦C.
Due to the structure of the private lattice Λprivate and the probabilistic property of the
noise vector, it is easy to find the CVP in Λprivate. More information about this can be found
in Section 4.
If we choose suitable public parameters for our cryptosystem, the coefficients of the four
polynomials in pG◦Φ +F ◦M lie in the interval [− q−1
2
, q−1
2
] and decryption does not fail.
Then, we can reduce pG ◦Φ +F ◦M modulo p and the term pG ◦Φ vanishes. Hence, the
message M is recovered by multiplying F ◦M (mod p) by F−1p from the left side.
The decryption phase of our cryptosystem, with dimension n, needs to calculate 14 con-
volution products instead of 32 in NTRU cryptosystem with dimension 4n2. The legitimate
receiver should solve a CVP in the private lattice Λprivate and this makes the decryption pro-
cess of our cryptosystem to be slower than NTRU. However, the presence of the private
ideal makes our cryptosystem to be secure against lattice based attacks; this is explained in
Section 5.
4 Successful decryption
It is important that the public parameters in the cryptosystem be chosen in such a way that
the probability of decryption failure is very small (e.g., 2−80) [19]. The decryption process
is successful if the closest vector to F ◦C = pG ◦Φ +F ◦M+B is found correctly and all
quaternion coefficients of V = pG◦Φ +F ◦M lie in the interval [− q−1
2
, q−1
2
].
Kouzmenko [25] demonstrates the validity of a simple probabilistic model for the coef-
ficients of the corresponding polynomial in the NTRU cryptosystem. Using this model, we
estimate the probability distribution of the coefficients of the polynomials in the quaternion
V = v0+ v1i+ v2 j+ v3k, under certain reasonable hypotheses. Therefore, by using similar
computations as in [28], we have
E(vi, j) = 0, (13)
Var(vi, j) =
16p2dφdg
n2
+
4d f (p
2−1)
6
, (14)
for i = 0, . . . ,3 and j = 0, . . . ,n2− 1. This together with the assumption that the vi, js have
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard deviation θ =
√
16p2dφ dg
n2
+
4d f (p2−1)
6
,
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gives
Pr
(
|vi, j| ≤ q−1
2
)
= 2Φ
(q−1
2θ
)
−1,
for i= 0, . . . ,3 and j= 0, . . . ,n2−1, where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function.
Thus, the probability for all coefficients ofV lying in the interval [− q−1
2
, q−1
2
], is determined
as (
2Φ
(q−1
2θ
)
−1
)4n2
.
Another reason for unsuccessful decryption is failing to estimate the vector B fromV ′ :=
F ◦C = V +B. Finding B involves solving a CVP in the private lattice Λprivate. In general,
CVP is an NP-hard problem and the computational complexity of the algorithms for finding
the closest vector of a lattice to an arbitrary vector is intractable, however it is tractable in
our special case which is described in the sequel.
We note that the closest vector problem is equivalent to the integer least-squares (ILS)
problem which is the problem of finding the least-squares solution to a system of linear
equations where the unknown vector is comprised of integers, but the matrix coefficient and
given vector are comprised of real numbers. Lifting V ′ = v′0+v
′
1i+v
′
2 j+v
′
3k from A/J into
A involves solving the CVP problem or the ILS problem inΛprivate with the generator matrix
Mprivate presented in Equation (5):
Argmin
z∈Z4n2
‖−→V ′− zMprivate‖2 =
3
∑
i=0
Argmin
zi∈Zn2
‖−→v′i − ziD′‖2. (15)
As argued in the previous section, the ideal Q can be viewed as an n2 dimensional lattice
ΛQ generated by the matrix D
′. Therefore, this step of our decryption involves solving four
CVP’s in dimension n2. Indeed, our problem is equivalent to finding the closest lattice point
in ΛQ to the given point
−→
v′i in Equation (15), for i= 0, . . . ,3, that has been perturbed by an
additive noise vector −→vi , where (−→v0 ,−→v1 ,−→v2 ,−→v3 ) =−→V =−−−−−−−−−−→pG◦Φ +F ◦M.
Our highest level of security occurs in n≥ 11 (n2 ≥ 121). There exist less complex meth-
ods for computing CVP in such small dimensions. One of the prominent methods is sphere
decoding that searches for the closest lattice point within a given hyper sphere [39], [17].
The sphere decoding is feasible in small dimensions, typically in dimensions less than 130
[37]. By applying some techniques (like LLL lattice reduction algorithm), the complexity
of this algorithm can be decreased [1].
We observe that
−→
V has Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance given in
Equation (14). We show in a numerical example that the variance of this additive noise is
small for an optimal decoder like sphere decoder. In the rest of this subsection, it is discussed
that in our case, the expected complexity of the sphere decoding algorithm is polynomial in
the dimension of the lattice ΛQ. Furthermore, since the dimension of ΛQ in the highest
security level is 121, which is less that 130, solving the CVP problems in our decryption
process are feasible.
We use the Poltyrev limit [34] to know the amount of the maximum variance of the
additive Gaussian noise under which a maximum-likelihood decoder like sphere decoder
results in a correct estimation of a desired lattice vector. Indeed, Poltyrev proved that there
exists a lattice Λ , with basis matrix L and large enough dimension N, such that decoding
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is possible with arbitrarily small error probability if and only if the variance of the additive
noise vector is smaller than
σ 2max :=
(
vol(Λ)
) 2
N
2pie
,
where vol(Λ) = |detL|.
If a lattice point is perturbed by a Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ 2, which
is smaller than σ 2max, the CVP problem can be solved in polynomial (or even cubic) time
using sphere decoding algorithm [17]. Indeed, the error probability of the sphere decoding
algorithm and its complexity are related to the variance of the additive noise. When the
variance of the additive noise is much smaller than σ 2max, the error probability of the sphere
decoding algorithm approaches zero and the algorithm returns the correct estimation for
a desired lattice vector. In this case, the complexity of the sphere decoding algorithm is
polynomial in the dimension of the lattice, which is reasonable and affordable in small
dimensions (typically less than 130).
According to the basis of ΛQ, vol(ΛQ) = |detD′|> qn2−|T | and a lower bound for σ 2max
is estimated as
σ 2max >
q
2(n2−|T |)
n2
2pie
=
q
2
(
1− |T |
n2
)
2pie
.
We have assumed that |T | ≤ n, therefore σ 2max > q
2
(
1− 1n
)
2pie . For the dimension n = 11, the
highest level of security in our cryptosystem, σ 2max > 885, while the variance of the additive
noise, Var(vi) ≈ 263, for i= 0, . . . ,3.
Since |T | is chosen very small compared to n2, the variance of the vectors vi’s is much
smaller than σ 2max. Also, the dimension of the lattice ΛQ in our highest level of security is
n2 = 121 < 130. Hence, if a legitimate receiver which has generator matrix D′, uses the
sphere decoding algorithm, then solves the CVP in the decryption process with negligible
error probability and affordable complexity and continues the decryption.
4.1 Parameter selection and comparisons
In BQTRU cryptosystem, we consider p 6= 2 since the probability of invertibility F modulo
p = 2 is too low. The initial condition n|(q− 1) is required. Since a primitive k-th root of
unity does not always exist modulo q, it is necessary to work in an extension ring. The
condition n|(q− 1) yields the factorization of xn− 1 into linear factors in Zq. Then, E is
a set of elements of Zq×Zq which has maximum cardinality n2. The subsets T ⊆ E are
chosen such that |T | is small compared to n2 (e.g. |T |< n). Therefore, the number of small
subsets T ⊆ E that can be selected is approximately equal to ∑ni=1
(
n2
i
)
. Then, the number of
ideals Qq generated by σ (x,y) = ∑
|T |
i=1 qiλai,bi(x,y) that can be used for decryption is
n
∑
i=1
(q−1)i
(
n2
i
)
.
For this reason, an exhaustive search for the ideal Qq containing 〈xn−1,yn−1〉 in Zq[x,y]
is infeasible when n is large enough. The large number of these ideals enhances the security
of the cryptosystem against brute force attack.
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The security of the NTRU cryptosystem depends on the size of all polynomials f ,g,r,m
and h. Since finding the private key ( f ,g) leads to solving SVP in the NTRU lattice [11],
when the sizes of f and g increase (d f and dg increase), the security of the private key
enhances. On the other hand, obtaining the message m leads to finding CVP in the NTRU
lattice [15] and then if the sizes of m and r increase (dm and dr increase), the security of the
message enhances. Therefore, increasing the size of f ,g,r andm is reasonable for enhancing
the security of NTRU but by increasing the size of f ,g,r and m, the expected size of p.g∗
r+ f ∗m is increased and then the probability of decryption failure is relatively increased.
Hence, there is a tradeoff between the message security and the key security; we can not
increase the size of the private key f ,g (for the key security) and the polynomials m and r
(for the message security), simultaneously.
In the proposed scheme, the presence of Q allows us to reduce the size of F and G (that
is, the size of fi’s and gi’s, for i= 0, . . . ,3) without detracting from the private key’s security.
This enables us to increase the sizes of Φ andM (increase dφ and dm) without increasing the
probability of decryption failure. In this sense, the proposed scheme is more robust against
message attacks than NTRU.
The decryption of NTRU is impractical when the sizes of the private keys are large while
in BQTRU, the decryption with small sizes of F and G is impossible when |T | is large.
The parameter sets in Table 1, are chosen sufficiently large to eliminate the possibility
of decryption failure. Namely, if we pick d f = dg = dφ = dm = d, since all polynomials in
V = pG◦Φ +F ◦M are ternary, their coefficients have maximum value equal to 2(6d+1)p.
It follows that no coefficient ofV can exceed 2(6d+1)p in absolute value and the decryption
is guaranteed to be successful if 2(6d+1)p< q/2 or q> 4(6d+1)p. Therefore, decryption
is successful if q> 24dp approximately and since d ≈ n2/7, then q> 24pn2/7 is sufficient
condition for the successful decryption in our cryptosystem. However, an examination of
the computation of the maximum coefficient of V shows that decryption is likely to succeed
even for considerably smaller values of q. Therefore, similar to the NTRU cryptosystem,
for additional efficiency and to reduce the size of the public key, it may be advantageous to
choose a smaller value of q.
In the NTRU cryptosystem with parameters (n,q′, p), which was introduced in Section
2.1, we state that if q′ > (6d+1)p or q′ > 2np (when we select d ≈ n/3), then decryption
never fails. Hence for the NTRU cryptosystem with parameter sets (4n2,q′, p), if q′ > 8n2p,
it has no decryption failure. It implies that q/q′ ≈ 3/7. Therefore, choosing the prime num-
ber q such that n|(q−1) and q≈ 3
7
q′, provides (n,q, p)-BQTRU with an equivalent level of
protection against decryption failure as (4n2,q′, p)-NTRU. We summarize our results about
the parameter’s selection in Table 1 given at the end of Section 5.
5 Security analysis
In this section, we discuss the key security and the message security of our cryptosystem.
We prove that the security of the proposed cryptosystem relies on the hardness of SVP in a
certain type of lattice. We show that our cryptosystem is secure against lattice based attacks
due to the specific structure of its lattice.
We recall that the convolution multiplication of two polynomials f and h in R=Z[x]/〈xn−
1〉 is equivalent to the matrix multiplication of the coefficient vector −→f and the circulant
matrix H of the coefficient vector
−→
h . This matrix is not circulant when f and h belong
to R′ = Z[x,y]/〈xn− 1,yn− 1〉. It can be shown that each row of H is a permutation of
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the coefficient vector
−→
h and these permutations are related to the monomial order that we
have used for R′. Consequently, the convolution product of two polynomials f and h in the
proposed cryptosystem is also equivalent to the matrix multiplication
−→
f H , where H is a
matrix such that its rows are a permutation of the coefficient vector
−→
h .
In the sequel, we explain how the key recovery of our cryptosystem is formulated as a
shortest vector problem in a certain special form of a lattice.
The parameters n, p, q, d f , dg, dφ and the public key H˜ = F
−1 ◦G+ϑ , where F ◦F−1 =
F−1 ◦F = 1 (mod J), are known to the attacker. For key recovery, the attacker should find
a vector (G,F,−ρ(γ)) which satisfies the equation F ◦ H˜ = G+ γ (mod q). Let F = f0+
f1i+ f2 j+ f3k and H˜ = h0+h1i+h2 j+h3k, where fi and hi are polynomials in the ring R
′,
for i= 0, . . . ,3. Then
F ◦ H˜ = ( f0+ f1i+ f2 j+ f3k)◦ (h0+h1i+h2 j+h3k))
= ( f0 ∗h0+ f1 ∗h1+ f2 ∗h2− f3 ∗h3)+( f0 ∗h1+ f1 ∗h0+ f2 ∗h3− f3 ∗h2)i
+ ( f0 ∗h2− f1 ∗h3+ f2 ∗h0+ f3 ∗h1) j+( f0 ∗h3+ f1 ∗h2− f2 ∗h1+ f3 ∗h0)k.
If we expand the quaternion equation F ◦ H˜ =G+γ (mod q) for a given quaternion H˜, then
we have a system of linear equations


f0 ∗h0+ f1 ∗h1+ f2 ∗h2− f3 ∗h3− γ0 = g0+qu0,
f0 ∗h1+ f1 ∗h0+ f2 ∗h3− f3 ∗h2− γ1 = g1+qu1,
f0 ∗h2− f1 ∗h3+ f2 ∗h0+ f3 ∗h1− γ2 = g2+qu2,
f0 ∗h3+ f1 ∗h2− f2 ∗h1+ f3 ∗h0− γ3 = g3+qu3,
(16)
where u0,u1,u2,u3 ∈ R′. We consider
H˜ =


H0 H1 H2 H3
H1 H0 −H3 H2
H2 H3 H0 −H1
−H3 −H2 H1 H0

 ,
where Hi is the corresponding matrix of
−→
hi = [hi0,hi1, · · · ,hin2−1], for i= 0, . . . ,3. Accord-
ing to the above mentioned issues
−−−→
F ◦ H˜ = −→F H˜ =
[−→
f0
−→
f1
−→
f2
−→
f3
]
H0 H1 H2 H3
H1 H0 −H3 H2
H2 H3 H0 −H1
−H3 −H2 H1 H0

 .
Therefore, when we represent the elements of A by their coefficient vectors in Z4n
2
, the
set ΛBQTRU formed by the vectors (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,−−−→ρ(γ)) that are also equivalent to the set of all
solutions (G,F,γ) to Equations (16), forms an integer lattice. From the above equations one
obtains that the BQTRU lattice, denoted by ΛBQTRU, is generated by the following matrix
MBQTRU =

 qI4n2 0 0H˜ I4n2 0
D 0 I4n2

 , (17)
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where
D=


D 0 0 0
0 D 0 0
0 0 D 0
0 0 0 D

 .
and D is an n2×n2 matrix which consists of −→λa,b, coefficient vectors of all Lagrange inter-
polators λa,b(x,y), such that (a,b) ∈ E.
We now consider that the public key H˜ is created using the private quaternions F , G and
γ and compute what happens when we multiply the MBQTRU by a carefully chosen vector.
Proposition 1 Assume that F ◦ H˜ = G+ γ (mod q), let U ∈ A be the quaternion that sat-
isfies
F ◦ H˜ = G+ γ +qU. (18)
Then
(
−→−U ,−→F ,−−−→ρ(γ))MBQTRU = (−→G ,−→F ,−
−−→
ρ(γ)),
and therefore the vector (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,−−−→ρ(γ)) belongs to the BQTRU lattice.
Proof When we multiply the vector (
−→−U ,−→F ,−−−→ρ(γ)) by the columns of MBQTRU , we have
(
−→−U ,−→F ,−−−→ρ(γ))MBQTRU = (−→−U ,−→F ,−
−−→
ρ(γ))

qI4n2 0 0H˜ I4n2 0
D 0 I4n2


= (−q−→U +−→F H˜ −−−→ρ(γ)D,−→F ,−−−→ρ(γ)).
Based on Equation (17), we have
−→
F H˜ =
−−−→
F ◦ H˜ and also
−−→
ρ(γ)D =
(
ρ(γ0)D, . . . ,ρ(γ3)D
)
=
( n2
∑
i=1
γ0(ai,bi)
−−→
λai,bi , . . . ,
n2
∑
i=1
γ3(ai,bi)
−−→
λai,bi
)
=
(−→γ0 , . . . ,−→γ3)=−→γ .
We obtain Equation (18) resulting in −qU +F ◦ H˜− γ = G. Thus,
(
−→−U ,−→F ,−−−→ρ(γ))MBQTRU = (
−−−−−−−−−−−→−qU +F ◦ H˜− γ ,−→F ,−−−→ρ(γ))
= (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,−−−→ρ(γ)),
and the private key is an integer linear combination of the rows of MBQTRU. Hence,
(
−→
G ,
−→
F ,−−−→ρ(γ)) ∈ΛBQTRU .

The quaternion γ ∈ Jq is a linear combination of λa,b’s and therefore it may have many
monomials with large coefficients. As a consequence, the Euclidean norm of
−−→
ρ(γ) may be
very large and the private key (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,−−−→ρ(γ)) ∈ Z4n2 ×Z4n2 ×Z4n2q may not be a short
nonzero vector in the BQTRU lattice using the Euclidean norm. Thus, we consider a hybrid
metric on Z4n
2 ×Z4n2 ×Z4n2q : Euclidean on the first two components and Hamming on the
third one.
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Definition 4 For every (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,
−−→
ρ(γ)) ∈ Z4n2 ×Z4n2 ×Z4n2q , the hybrid norm is defined as
‖(−→G ,−→F ,−−→ρ(γ))‖hyb := ‖(−→G ,−→F )‖2+‖
−−→
ρ(γ)‖H ,
where ‖ · ‖2 and ‖ · ‖H are the Euclidean and Hamming norms, respectively.
It can be easily shown that ‖ · ‖hyb has the properties of a norm.
In this case, since ρ(γ) is determined by the element of the subset T , where |T | is small,
the Hamming norm of
−−→
ρ(γ) is small. Moreover, the Euclidean norm of
−→
F and
−→
G is small.
Therefore, the private key is a short vector in the lattice measured by the hybrid metric.
In the sequel, we present several results and show that recovering the private key can be
reduced to solving an SVP in the BQTRU lattice with hybrid norm.
Lemma 6 ([12]) Let F be an arbitrary field. Given a set U ⊂ F of size n, then any polyno-
mial f (x,y) ∈ F [x,y] of degree less than n in each variable, is determined by its evaluation
in U×U.
LetU = {b ∈ Zq | bn = 1}, where the condition n|(q−1) yields |U |= n. Then, Lemma
6 implies that any polynomial f in R′ is determined by its evaluation on U ×U = E or
equivalently by knowing the vector ρ( f ).
Corollary 2 Let f and g be two polynomials in R′ such that ρ( f ) = ρ(g). Then, f = g.
Obviously, this result is satisfied in the case that F and G are two quaternions in Awhere
ρ(F) = ρ(G).
We use the next lemma to show that for two fixed quaternions F and G satisfying the
public key equation (6), the vector
−−→
ρ(γ) has the smallest Hamming norm among all quater-
nions that can be chosen as the third component in the private key (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,−−−→ρ(γ)).
Lemma 7 Let F and G be two fixed quaternions satisfying Equation (6). Then for any
element τ ′ 6= ϑ belonging to the set
χ = {τ ′ ∈ A | F ◦F ′ = F ′ ◦F = 1+α ′ ◦ τ ′ (modq), H˜ = F ′ ∗G+ τ ′ (modq)},
we have ‖−−−→ρ(τ ′)‖H > 4|T |.
Proof We know H˜ = F−1 ◦G+ϑ (mod q), where F ◦F−1 = F−1 ◦F = 1+α ◦σ (mod q).
Therefore, F ◦F−1 = F−1 ◦F = 1+α ′′ ◦W ◦σ (mod q) too, where α ′′ ∈ A. Then, ϑ =
W ◦σ ∈ χ . Using Equation (10) and (11), we have
ρ(H˜) = ρ(F−1)•ρ(G)+ρ(ϑ )
=
(
0, . . . ,0,F−1(a|T |+1,b|T |+1)◦G(a|T |+1,b|T |+1), . . . ,F−1(an2 ,bn2)◦G(an2 ,bn2)
)
+
(
q1W, . . . ,q|T |W,0, . . . ,0
)
,
that is,
ρ(H˜) =
(
q1W, . . . ,q|T |W,F−1(a|T |+1,b|T |+1)◦G(a|T |+1,b|T |+1), . . .
. . . ,F−1(an2 ,bn2 )◦G(an2 ,bn2)
)
. (19)
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If we consider an arbitrary τ ′ ∈ χ , where τ ′ 6= ϑ , then
F ◦F ′ = F ′ ◦F = 1+α ′ ◦ τ ′ (modq), H˜ = F ′ ◦G+ τ ′ (modq).
Similarly,
ρ(H˜) = ρ(F ′)•ρ(G)+ρ(τ ′)
=
(
0, . . . ,0,F ′(a|T |+1,b|T |+1)◦G(a|T |+1,b|T |+1), . . . ,F ′(an2 ,bn2)◦G(an2 ,bn2 )
)
+ρ(τ ′).
As a result τ ′(ai,bi) = qiW 6= 0, for i= 1, . . . , |T |. On the other hand, τ ′ 6= ϑ and F ′(ai,bi)◦
G(ai,bi) 6= F−1(ai,bi) ◦G(ai,bi) for some i = |T |+ 1, . . . ,n2. Therefore, ρ(τ ′) should be
nonzero on at least one of the n2−|T | last positions. Hence ‖−−−→ρ(τ ′)‖H > 4|T |. 
Proposition 2 Let F and G be two fixed quaternions satisfying Equation (6). Then, ϑ =
W ◦σ has the smallest Hamming norm in χ . Also, for any τ ′ ∈ χ such that τ ′ 6= ϑ
‖−−−−−→ρ(F ◦ τ ′)‖H ≥ ‖
−−−−−→
ρ(F ◦ϑ )‖H ,
where, in accordance with Equation (12), we have
−−→
ρ(γ) =
−−−−−→
ρ(F ◦ϑ ).
Proof Since ϑ ∈ χ and ‖−−−→ρ(ϑ )‖H = 4|T | (according to Equation (11)), then ϑ has the small-
est Hamming norm in χ . Let τ ′ ∈ χ , where τ ′ 6= ϑ . Then, we have
F ◦F ′ = F ′ ◦F = 1+α ′ ◦ τ ′ (modq), H˜ = F ′ ◦G+ τ ′ (modq).
Therefore,
F ◦ H˜ = G+(α ′ ◦ τ ′ ◦G+F ◦ τ ′) (modq).
Moreover, H˜ = F−1 ◦G+ϑ (mod q) and by considering Equation (7) and (8), we have
F ◦ H˜ = G+ γ (modq),
where γ = (σ ◦α ◦G+F ◦ϑ ). Thus,
α ′ ◦ τ ′ ◦G+F ◦ τ ′ = σ ◦α ◦G+F ◦ϑ ,
ρ(α ′ ◦ τ ′ ◦G+F ◦ τ ′) = ρ(σ ◦α ◦G+F ◦ϑ ),
ρ(α ′ ◦ τ ′ ◦G)+ρ(F ◦ τ ′) = ρ(F ◦ϑ ),
ρ(F ◦ τ ′) = ρ(F ◦ϑ )−ρ(α ′ ◦ τ ′ ◦G).
Hence, we can conclude that
‖−−−−−→ρ(F ◦ τ ′)‖H ≥ ‖
−−−−−→
ρ(F ◦ϑ )‖H .

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An important consequence of this proposition is that for fixed quaternions F and G that sat-
isfy Equation (6), ϑ ∈ χ is the best choice in the public key equation (6) and−−→ρ(γ)=−−−−−→ρ(F ◦ϑ )
has the smallest Hamming norm among all quaternions that can be chosen as the third com-
ponent in the solution of the public key equation. Consequently, ‖−→G ,−→F ,−−−−−→ρ(F ◦ϑ )‖hyb <
‖−→G ,−→F ,−−−−−→ρ(F ◦ τ ′)‖hyb, for any τ ′ ∈ χ .
In the following theorem which is the most important result of this section, we prove that
any reduction in the Hamming norm of the third component of a solution of the public key
equation (6) like (
−→
G′′,
−→
F ′′,
−−−−−−→
ρ(F ′′ ◦ τ ′′)), where H˜ = F ′′−1 ◦G′′+τ ′′ (mod q) and F ′′ ◦F ′′−1 =
F ′′−1 ◦F ′′ = 1+α ′′ ◦ τ ′′ (mod q), results in a considerable increase in the hybrid norm of
the solution (
−→
G′′,
−→
F ′′,
−−−−−−→
ρ(F ′′ ◦ τ ′′)).
Theorem 4 Assume that there exist F ′′, G′′ ∈ A and τ ′′ ∈ Jq such that H˜ = F ′′−1 ◦G′′+
τ ′′ (mod q), F ′′ ◦F ′′−1 = F ′′−1 ◦F ′′ = 1+α ′′ ◦ τ ′′ (mod q), for some α ′′ ∈ A (that is, they
are a solution of the public key equation) and ‖−−−→ρ(τ ′′)‖H < ‖
−−−→
ρ(ϑ )‖H . Then∥∥∥−→G′′,−→F ′′,−−−−−−→ρ(F ′′ ◦ τ ′′)∥∥∥
hyb
>
∥∥∥−→G ,−→F ,−−−−−→ρ(F ◦ϑ )∥∥∥
hyb
.
Proof Let supp(F) = {(a,b) ∈ E | F(a,b) 6= 0}, for any F ∈ A. Using Equation (11), we
have |supp(ϑ )|= |T |. Without loss of generality we consider that |supp(τ ′′)|= |T |−1 and
ρ(τ ′′) is nonzero over the first |T |−1 positions. Similar to the initial considerations that we
presented for private key and public key in our proposed scheme, if F ′′ = f ′′0 + f
′′
1 i+ f
′′
2 j+
f ′′3 k and G
′′ = g′′0+g
′′
1 i+g
′′
2 j+g
′′
3k in A and τ
′′ ∈ Jq are a solution of the public key equation
(6) for given public key H˜, then
H˜ = F ′′−1 ◦G′′+ τ ′′ (modq), F ′′ ◦F ′′−1 = F ′′−1 ◦F ′′ = 1+α ′′ ◦ τ ′′ (modq), (20)
where,
supp(τ ′′) =
⋂3
i=0
{(a,b) ∈ E | g′′i (a,b) = 0},
{(a,b) ∈ E | N(F ′′)(a,b) = 0} ⊂ supp(τ ′′).
Therefore,
ρ(H˜) = ρ(F ′′−1)•ρ(G′′)+ρ(τ ′′)
= (0, . . . ,0,F ′′−1(a|T |,b|T |)◦G′′(a|T |,b|T |), . . . ,F ′′−1(an2 ,bn2 )◦G′′(an2 ,bn2)
)
+
(
τ ′′(a1,b1), . . . ,τ ′′(a|T |−1,b|T |−1),0, . . . ,0
)
=
(
τ ′′(a1,b1), . . . ,τ ′′(a|T |−1,b|T |−1),F ′′−1(a|T |,b|T |)◦G′′(a|T |,b|T |), . . .
. . . ,F ′′−1(an2 ,bn2)◦G′′(an2 ,bn2 )
)
.
On the other hand, Equation (19) gives
ρ(H˜) =
(
q1W, . . . ,q|T |W,F−1(a|T |+1,b|T |+1)◦G(a|T |+1,b|T |+1), . . .
. . . ,F−1(an2 ,bn2 )◦G(an2 ,bn2)
)
.
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Thus, we obtain
τ ′′(ai,bi) = qiW = ϑ (ai,bi), i= 1, . . . , |T |−1; (21)
F ′′−1(a|T |,b|T |)◦G′′(a|T |,b|T |) = q|T |W, i= |T |; (22)
F ′′−1(ai,bi)◦G′′(ai,bi) = F−1(ai,bi)◦G(ai,bi), i= |T |+1, . . . ,n2. (23)
Therefore, ϑ = τ ′′+(q|T |W )◦λa|T |,b|T | and H˜ = F−1 ◦G+τ ′′+(q|T |W )◦λa|T | ,b|T | (mod q).
As a result
F ′′−1 ◦G′′ = F−1 ◦G+(q|T |W )◦λa|T | ,b|T | . (24)
We can consider
F ′′−1 = F−1+∑
n2
i=1
(
F ′′−1(ai,bi)−F−1(ai,bi)
)
◦λai,bi ,
G′′ = G+∑
n2
i=1
(
G′′(ai,bi)−G(ai,bi)
)
◦λai,bi ,
since by Lemma 6 they are equal over the set E. Next,
F ′′−1 ◦G′′ = F−1 ◦G+∑n
2
i=1
(
F ′′−1(ai,bi)◦G′′(ai,bi)−F−1(ai,bi)◦G(ai,bi)
)
◦λai,bi
= F−1 ◦G+∑n
2
i=|T |+1
(
F ′′−1(ai,bi)◦G′′(ai,bi)−F−1(ai,bi)◦G(ai,bi)
)
◦λai,bi
+
(
F ′′−1(a|T |,b|T |)◦G′′(a|T |,b|T |)
)
◦λa|T |,b|T |
= F−1 ◦G+∑n
2
i=|T |+1
(
F ′′−1(ai,bi)◦G′′(ai,bi)−F−1(ai,bi)◦G(ai,bi)
)
◦λai,bi
+
(
q|T |W
)
◦λa|T |,b|T | .
From the last equation and Equation (24) we have
∑
n2
i=|T |+1
(
F ′′−1(ai,bi)◦G′′(ai,bi)−F−1(ai,bi)◦G(ai,bi)
)
◦λai,bi = 0,
that is, F ′′−1(ai,bi) and G′′(ai,bi) satisfy Equation (23). Without loss of generality, we take
F ′′−1(ai,bi) = F−1(ai,bi) and G′′(ai,bi) = G(ai,bi), for i= |T |+1, . . . ,n2, then
F ′′−1 = F−1+∑
|T |
i=1
(
F ′′−1(ai,bi)−F−1(ai,bi)
)◦λai,bi , (25)
G′′ = G+∑
|T |
i=1
(
G′′(ai,bi)−G(ai,bi)
)◦λai,bi . (26)
Next, we prove that
F ′′ = F+∑
|T |
i=1
(
F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi)
)◦λai,bi . (27)
Indeed, we show that F ′′ as above satisfies the equation F ′′ ◦F ′′−1 = F ′′−1 ◦F ′′ = 1+θ ◦τ ′′
(mod q), where θ ∈A. We know F ◦F−1 = F−1 ◦F = 1+β ◦ϑ (mod q), for some β ∈A.
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Therefore, in accordance to Equation (20) and (21), we have
F ′′ ◦F ′′−1
= F ◦F−1+∑|T |i=1
(
F ′′(ai,bi)◦F ′′−1(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi)◦F−1(ai,bi)
)
◦λai,bi
= 1+β ◦ϑ +
(
F ′′(a|T |,b|T |)◦F ′′−1(a|T |,b|T |)−F(a|T |,b|T |)◦F−1(a|T |,b|T |)
)
◦λa|T | ,b|T |
+∑
|T |−1
i=1
(
F ′′(ai,bi)◦F ′′−1(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi)◦F−1(ai,bi)
)
◦λai,bi
= 1+β ◦ϑ +
(
1−(1+β (a|T |,b|T |)◦ϑ (a|T |,b|T |))◦λa|T | ,b|T |)
+∑
|T |−1
i=1
((
1+α ′′(ai,bi)◦ τ ′′(ai,bi)
)−(1+β (ai,bi)◦ϑ (ai,bi)))◦λai,bi
= 1+β ◦ϑ −β (a|T |,b|T |)◦ϑ (a|T |,b|T |)◦λa|T |,b|T | +∑
|T |−1
i=1
ξ (ai,bi)◦ τ ′′(ai,bi)◦λai,bi
= 1+∑
|T |
i=1
β (ai,bi)◦ϑ (ai,bi)◦λai,bi −β (a|T |,b|T |)◦ϑ (a|T |,b|T |)◦λa|T |,b|T |
+∑
|T |−1
i=1
ξ (ai,bi)◦ τ ′′(ai,bi)◦λai,bi
= 1+∑
|T |−1
i=1
β (ai,bi)◦ϑ (ai,bi)◦λai,bi +∑
|T |−1
i=1
ξ (ai,bi)◦ τ ′′(ai,bi)◦λai,bi
= 1+∑
|T |−1
i=1
β (ai,bi)◦ τ ′′(ai,bi)◦λai,bi +∑
|T |−1
i=1
ξ (ai,bi)◦ τ ′′(ai,bi)◦λai,bi
= 1+ τ ′′ ◦
(
∑
|T |−1
i=1
β (ai,bi)◦λai,bi
)
+ τ ′′ ◦
(
∑
|T |−1
i=1
ξ (ai,bi)◦λai,bi
)
= 1+β ◦ τ ′′+ξ ◦ τ ′′ = 1+θ ◦ τ ′′.
Thus, F ′′ = F+∑|T |i=1
(
F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi)
)◦λai,bi and
‖−→F ′′‖22 = ‖
−→
F ‖22+
∥∥∥∑|T |i=1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi))◦λai,bi∥∥∥22
+2
(−→
F · (∑|T |i=1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi))◦λai,bi(x,y))),
where “ · ” is the inner product. Since F is a small ternary quaternion polynomial, −→F is a
vector with most elements equal to zero and the rest are 1 or −1. As a consequence, many
products in
(−→
F ·(∑|T |i=1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi))◦λai ,bi)) vanish. On the other hand, the poly-
nomials λai,bi , for i= 0, . . . , |T |, have many monomials with large coefficients and then the
vectors
−−→
λai,bi ’s have many nonzero coefficients with large values belonging to Zq. There-
fore, the Euclidian norm of ∑
|T |
i=1
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(
F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi)
)◦λai,bi is very larger with respect to(−→
F · (∑|T |i=1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi))◦λai,bi)). Hence,∥∥∥∑|T |i=1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi))◦λai ,bi∥∥∥22 > 2
(−→
F · (∑|T |i=1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→(F ′′(ai,bi)−F(ai,bi))◦λai,bi)),
and the immediate result is
‖−→F ′′‖2 > ‖−→F ‖2.
Under the same computations and according to Equation (26), we have ‖−→G′′‖2 > ‖−→G ‖2.
Putting all pieces together, a small reduction in the Hamming norm of
−−−→
ρ(τ ′′), leads to a
small reduction in the Hamming norm of
−−−−−−→
ρ(F ′′ ◦ τ ′′), entailing a high Euclidean norm for−→F ′′
and
−→
G′′. This gives a considerable enlargement for the hybrid norm of (
−→
G′′,
−→
F ′′,
−−−−−−→
ρ(F ′′ ◦ τ ′′)).
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One concludes that the private key (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,
−−→
ρ(γ)) = (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,
−−−−−→
ρ(F ◦ϑ )) is mostly likely one
of the nonzero shortest vectors in ΛBQTRU . 
We remark that a consequence of the previous theorem is that recovering the private key in
our cryptosystem can be reduced to solving an SVP in a lattice with hybrid norm.
5.1 Lattice based attack
The lattice based attacks, presented by Coppersmith and Shamir [11], are the most important
attacks on the NTRU cryptosystem. The purposes of this type of attacks can be classified in
two subclasses: an attempt at finding the private key and an attempt at obtaining the message.
In this section, we present a lattice based attack that attempts at obtaining the private key.
We show that our cryptosystem is secure against lattice based attacks.
In Theorem 4 it is shown that the private key (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,
−−→
ρ(γ)) is with high probability one
of the nonzero shortest vectors, measured by the hybrid metric, in ΛBQTRU . Solving SVP or
CVP with the hybrid metric is a challenging problem and as far as we know no algorithm
has been developed to handle them. In the following we expand our BQTRU lattice to a
lattice for which the SVP and CVP are measured using the Euclidean norm.
We select a small subset {c0,c1, . . . ,cl} of elements of Zq such that each element z ∈ Zq
can be represented as ∑li=0 zi ·ci, where (z0,z1, . . . ,zl) is a vector with small Euclidean norm.
In this work, we consider {c0,c1, . . . ,cl} = {1,2, . . . ,2l}, where 2l ≤ q < 2l+1. Then, we
expand the BQTRU lattice to the lattice which is generated by the rows of the following
matrix
Mexpanded =

 qI4n2 0 0H˜ I4n2 0
D 0 I4(l+1)n2

 ,
where
D =


c⊗D 0 0 0
0 c⊗D 0 0
0 0 c⊗D 0
0 0 0 c⊗D

 , c= [ c0,c1, . . . ,cl ]Tr .
Then, we solve SVP in this lattice, Λexpanded, that is measured under the Euclidean metric.
Finally, the points of the expanded lattice are mapped to the points of the original lattice as
follows
ψ : Z4n
2 ×Z4n2 ×
4(l+1) times︷ ︸︸ ︷
Z
n2
2 ×·· ·×Zn
2
2 → Z4n
2 ×Z4n2 ×
4 times︷ ︸︸ ︷
Z
n2
q ×·· ·×Zn
2
q
(r,s,B0,0, . . . ,B0,l ,B1,0, . . . ,B1,l , . . . ,B3,0, . . . ,B3,l) 7→ (r,s,
l
∑
i=0
B0,ici,
l
∑
i=0
B1,ici, . . . ,
l
∑
i=0
B3,ici).
The binary representation of any z ∈ Zq is unique and all zi in the linear combination z =
∑li=0 zi · ci are one or zero. Therefore, the Euclidean norm of (z0,z1, . . . ,zl) is small. Hence,
if we consider {c0,c1, . . . ,cl} = {1,2, . . . ,2l}, where l = ⌊log2 q⌋, then any z ∈ Zq can be
written as a linear combination of them. Since the binary representation of any z ∈ Zq is
unique, then the mapping ψ is one to one and this mapping returns a unique solution.
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We show that the equivalent vector for the private key (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,
−−→
ρ(γ)) in the expanded lat-
tice is its shortest vector under the Euclidean norm. If we consider the binary representation
of any point in ρ(γi), for i= 0, . . . ,3, we have
ρ(γi) =
(
γi(a1,b1),γi(a2,b2), . . . ,γi(an2 ,bn2)
)
=
( l
∑
j=0
zi,1 jc j,
l
∑
j=0
zi,2 jc j, . . . ,
l
∑
j=0
zi,n2 jc j
)
.
Also
ρ(γi)D =
( l
∑
j=0
zi,1 jc j,
l
∑
j=0
zi,2 jc j, . . . ,
l
∑
j=0
zi,n2 jc j
)
D
=
( l
∑
j=0
(zi,1 j,zi,2 j, . . . ,zi,n2 j)
)
c jD
=
(
(zi,10,zi,20, . . . ,zi,n20),(zi,11,zi,21, . . . ,zi,n21), . . . ,(zi,1l ,zi,2l , . . . ,zi,n2l)
)


c0D
c1D
...
clD


= (Ai,0,Ai,1, . . . ,Ai,l)


c0D
c1D
...
clD


=
l
∑
j=0
Ai, jc jD.
Therefore, (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l) is the equivalent vector of the private key
and(−→−U ,−→F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l)Mexpand
=
(
−q−→U +−→F H˜ +( l∑
i=0
A0,iciD, . . . ,
l
∑
i=0
A3,iciD
)
,
−→
F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l
)
=
(
−q−→U +−→F H˜ +(ρ(γ0)D, . . . ,ρ(γ3)D),−→F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l)
=
(
−q−→U +−→F H˜ +−−→ρ(γ)D,−→F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l
)
=
(−−−−−−−−−−−→−qU +F ◦ H˜+ γ ,−→F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l)
=
(−→
G ,
−→
F ,A00, . . . ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l
)
.
We conclude that, (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l) ∈Λexpanded. Next we show that it
is one of the shortest vector in the expanded lattice.
In the following proposition, we consider the recommended parameters in Section 4.1
in such a way that the possibility of decryption failure be negligible. Choosing the prime
number q such that n|(q− 1) and q > 24dp in the BQTRU cryptosystem ensures that the
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decryption never fails. Following the method of selecting parameters in NTRU (see Propo-
sition 6.61 of [19]), for simplicity, we can remove p in the last equation and assume that
q ≈ 24d. Moreover, q = αn+ 1, for some α ∈ N. Hence, since d ≈ n2/7 in BQTRU, we
consider a prime number q, where q≈ 24n2/7+1 in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let (n, p,q,d) be BQTRU parameters such that
d ≈ n2/7, q≈ 24n2/7+1, |T | ≤ n.
Then the Gaussian heuristic predicts that the equivalent vector of the private key inΛexpanded,
that is (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l), is the shortest nonzero vector in the Λexpand
with maximum likelihood.
Proof The average length of the shortest nonzero vector in a lattice Λ with dimension n is
predicted by the Gaussian heuristic [19] (see page 377) as
λ1(Λ) =
√
n
2pie
(det(Λ))
1
n .
This prediction in the extended lattice with dimension (4l+12)n2 and det(Λexpand) = q
4n2
is
λ1(Λexpand) =
√
(4l+12)n2
2pie
q
4
(4l+12) .
Since 2l ≤ q< 2l+1, we have
λ1(Λexpand)≥
√
(2l+6)n2
pie
2
l
(l+3) ,
where l = ⌊log2 q⌋ and we assume q ≈ 24n2/7+ 1 ≈ 3.4n2 + 1. Therefore, we can paste
l ≈ log2(3.4n2+1) and have
λ1(Λexpand)≥
√(
(2log2(3.4n
2+1)+6)n2
)(
(3.4n2+1)2
)1/(log2(27.4n2+8))
pie
.
On the other hand, if ‖−−→ρ(γ)‖H = t ′, then
‖g, f ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l‖2 ≤
√
16d+ t ′(l+1).
Since d ≈ n2/7 and t ′ < 4|T |, then
‖g, f ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l‖2 ≤
√
16n2
7
+4|T |(log2(3.4n2+1)+1).
In general, we consider |T | ≤ n and hence for n≥ 7,√
16n2
7
+4n(log2(3.4n
2+1)+1)
≤
√(
(2log2(3.4n
2+1)+6)n2
)(
(3.4n2+1)2
)1/(log2(27.4n2+8))
pie
.
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This proves that
‖g, f ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l‖2 ≤ λ1(Λexpand),
and if n is large, with high probability, (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,A0,0, . . . ,A0,l , . . . ,A3,0, . . . ,A3,l) is the shortest
nonzero vector in the expanded lattice using Euclidean norm. 
The image of the vector in the proof of the previous proposition is the private key
(
−→
G ,
−→
F ,
−−→
ρ(γ)) under the mapping ψ . Indeed, finding the approximate solution of SVP in
the hybrid metric leads to expanding this lattice to a lattice with a higher dimension and
finding SVP in the expanded lattice. Therefore, finding the private key in our cryptosystem
with parameters (n, p,q) is equivalent to finding a shortest vector in the expanded lattice
with dimension (4l+12)n2 = (4log2(3.4n
2+1)+12)n2.
In this case, since dim(ΛNTRU) = 8n
2 and dim(Λexpand) = 12n
2 + 4n2 log2(3.4n
2 + 1),
the dimension of Λexpand is at least (2+ log2 n) times larger than the dimension of NTRU
lattice with parameters (4n2,q′, p):
dim(Λexpand)
dim(ΛNTRU)
=
12n2+4n2 log2(3.4n
2+1)
8n2
=
3
2
+
log2(3.4n
2+1)
2
≥ 3
2
+
log2 3.4
2
+
log2 n
2
2
≥ 3
2
+
1.7
2
+ log2 n≥ 2+ log2 n.
For example when n= 7, the dimension of the expanded lattice is approximately 2036 while
the dimension of (4n2,q′, p)-NTRU lattice is 392. This increase in the dimension of the lat-
tice forces high cost to the attacker of the cryptosystem. We note that only the attacker, for
key recovery, faces with this higher dimensions caused by the expansion. Since the com-
putational complexity increases as a result of this expansion, this cryptosystem achieves a
good security against lattice attacks.
We observe that we can reduce the size of the private keys F and G without violating
the system security. This allows the use of larger messages. As a consequence, the security
of the message is also increased.
5.2 Brute force attack
In our cryptosystem, the public parameters are n, p, q, d f , dg, dφ and the public key is
equal to H˜ = F−1 ◦G (mod J), where J = 〈σ ,q〉A. For a brute-force search, Eve searches
exhaustively every possible key and tests whether it is the correct one or not. In order to
break our cryptosystem, she searches all quaternions F , G and polynomials σ which satisfy
the equation F ◦ H˜ = G (mod 〈σ ,q〉A). Therefore, she may first enumerate all candidates
for the ideal Q = 〈σ ,q〉 that can be used for decryption. Then she tries each quaternion
F = f0 + f1i+ f2 j+ f3k ∈ A where fi ∈ L f , for i = 0, . . . ,3, until she finds a decryption
key. That is, she finds the private key F by verifying that F ◦ H˜ (mod J) is a small ternary
quaternion polynomial. Eve could also find the private key by trying all possible quaternions
G= g0+g1i+g2 j+g3k ∈Awhere gi ∈ Lg, for i= 0, . . . ,3, and G◦H−1 (mod J) is a small
ternary quaternion.
The number of possible ideals Q generated by σ (x,y) = ∑
|T |
i=1 qiλai,bi(x,y) is equal to
n
∑
i=1
(q−1)i
(
n2
i
)
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and the number of possible small ternary quaternions F and G is
#LF =
(
n2
d f
)4(
n2−d f
d f
)4
,
#LG =
(
n2
dg
)4(
n2−dg
dg
)4
.
On the other hand, ρ(γ) = ρ(F ◦ϑ ) where ϑ =W ◦σ andW ∈ A⋆q. Therefore, she needs to
check |A⋆q| quaternion W to find ρ(γ). Since dg is generally smaller than d f , LG is smaller
than LF . Hence, using a Meet-In-The-Middle attack approach [21], the search space for
recovering the private key (
−→
G ,
−→
F ,−−−→ρ(γ)) is approximately(
Key
Security
)
= |A⋆q|
(
n2
dg
)2(
n2−dg
dg
)2 n
∑
i=1
(q−1)i
(
n2
i
)
,
where A⋆q is the set of invertible elements in Aq.
Using another point of view, Eve can just try to recover the original message M from
the corresponding ciphertext C, instead of making a total break by finding the private key
(
−→
G ,
−→
F ,−−−→ρ(γ)). She simply tries all random quaternion Φ = φ0+φ1i+φ2 j+φ3k ∈ A such
that φi ∈ Lφ for i= 0,1,2,3 and test whetherC− pH˜ ◦Φ (mod q) is a small ternary quater-
nion or not. If the obtained quaternion has small coefficients it might be the original message
M. Hence the search space for recovering the message (using a Meet-In-The-Middle attack
approach) is (
Message
Security
)
=
(
n2
dφ
)2(
n2−dφ
dφ
)2
=
(n2!)2
(dφ !)4 (n2−2dφ )!2 .
The key and message security estimates for the presented parameter sets in NTRU, QTRU
Table 1 Public key size, parameter sets and their specified security levels with comparisons to NTRU [20]
and QTRU [28] cryptosystems (in each case p= 3).
Sec. level Cryptosystem n q d f dg dφ Key Sec. Msg. Sec. Successful dec. Public key size (bit)
Moderate NTRU 167 128 60 20 18 282 277 0.9999292925 1169
Highest NTRU 503 256 215 72 55 2285 2170 0.9999532447 4024
Moderate QTRU 47 59 7 6 5 290 280 0.9986364660 1128
Highest QTRU 149 191 22 15 12 2263 2225 0.9999998808 4768
Moderate BQTRU 7 113 7 6 6 > 2166 292 0.9985784846 1372
Highest BQTRU 11 199 17 17 13 > 2396 2212 0.9999995349 3872
and BQTRU cryptosystems are given in Table 1. The provided lower bounds on the key
security for BQTRU are given by assuming |A⋆q|= 1. According to this table, the brute-force
attack on BQTRU with values greater than n= 11 appears to be practically impossible. That
is a necessary condition but not really a strong argument for security.
Moreover, the public key size of these cryptosystems is presented in Table 1. The public
key in NTRU cryptosystem is a polynomial in Rq = Zq[x]/〈xn− 1〉, therefore its key size
is equal to n⌈log2 q⌉ bits. In QTRU cryptosystem, the public key includes four polynomials
in Rq and then the public key size is equal to 4n⌈log2 q⌉ bits. Furthermore, the public key
size of the proposed scheme is 4n2⌈log2 q⌉ bits due to the four public polynomials hi ∈ R′q =
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Zq[x,y]/〈xn−1,yn−1〉, for i = 0, . . . ,3. According to the result of Table 1, the public key
size of BQTRU is smaller than NTRU and QTRU with higher security level.
See Section 4.1 for more details about the parameter’s selection. These parameter sets,
which are obtained from our experiments, are chosen in such a way that the parameter q
be a prime number, n|(q−1) and q ≈ 3
7
q′, where q′ is equivalent parameter in (4n2,q′, p)-
NTRU. Then, (n,q, p)-BQTRU has an equivalent level of security as (4n2,q′, p)-NTRU. We
compare the combinatorial security of NTRU, QTRU and BQTRU in light of the meet-in-
the-middle attack, with the prescribed parameter sets for two different security levels.
5.3 The Gentry attack
The parameter n of the ring R=Z[x]/< xn−1> in the original version of NTRU cryptosys-
tem, is chosen to be a prime number, because having n prime maximizes the probability that
the private key has an inverse with respect to a specified modulus. In 1999, Silverman has
proposed taking n to be a power of 2 to allow the use of Fast Fourier Transforms when com-
puting the convolution product of elements in the ring [36]. In the Gentry’s attack [15], it is
shown that choosing a composite number n= cd, especially one with a small factor, signifi-
cantly reduces the security of the NTRU cryptosystem. Indeed, when n= cd is a composite
number, a ring homomorphism is used to construct much smaller (and more easily reduce-
able) lattices whose shortest vectors contain at least some useful cryptanalytic information
about the secret key.
In general, when n is composite and d is a nontrivial divisor, there exist a ring homo-
morphism
Z[x]/(xn−1) −→ Z[x]/(xd−1)
f 7→ f (d).
Then a 2d-dimensional lattice Λ(d) analog to the NTRU lattice can be constructed. This
lattice contains the vector ( f (d),g(d)). Therefore, at least when d >
√
n, ( f (d),g(d)) is
almost certainly the shortest vector in Λ(d) for the same reasons that ( f ,g) is almost cer-
tainly the shortest vector for the NTRU lattice. Thus, significant partial information about
the private key is recovered by reducing to a 2d-dimensional lattice. Alternatively, we can
use ( f (d),g(d)) to recover ( f ,g). We thereby obtain the private key without ever having
to reduce a 2n-dimensional lattice in NTRU. Indeed, we can decrease the dimension of the
NTRU lattice by about 2d in a similar fashion. This 2d reduction in lattice dimension should
reduce LLL’s running time by a factor exponential in 2d. To avoid the presented attack, n
should be chosen to be prime, or to have only large nontrivial factors [15].
We now consider this attack on BQTRU in the same context. Indeed, for the bivariate
case, the ring dimension is n2 which is composite (n2 = n · n) and there are many suitable
homomorphisms from the bivariate NTRU ring Z[x,y]/(xn−1,yn−1) to a univariate NTRU
ring Z[t]/(tn − 1); suitable maps are all the maps φr,s : x→ tr,y→ ts [4]. Therefore, the
Gentry attack can be applied against BQTRU. For considering this attack, we should map
the BQTRU lattice, from bivariate to univariate. However, the problem is more difficult than
in the NTRU case since the Euclidean part of the BQTRU lattice can pass to the quotient
but this is not the case for the Lagrange part D. When we use a homomorphism to map
λa,b(x,y) to the univariate ring, then its image is not an univariate interpolator. In fact it
is a product of two univariate interpolators [4]. Hence, while the the Euclidean part can
be reduced from dimension n2 to dimension n, the Lagrange part D is reduced from n2 to
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approximately n2/2 dimension. As a consequence, solving the reduced lattice remains too
hard and we conjecture that BQTRU is practically secure against this attack. This problem
is left for future study.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a NTRU-like public key cryptosystem based on the quaternion
algebras and bivariate polynomials. We show that the multiplication operation in our cryp-
tosystem can be done by means of matrix multiplication. Using Strassen’s efficient method
for (2×2) matrix multiplication, we obtain 16/7 times faster operations in the key gener-
ation and encryption process of our cryptosystem compared to NTRU within comparable
parameters.
For designing a cryptosystem which is resistant against known lattice based attacks for
low dimensions, we use bivariate polynomials ring and an ideal of this ring. This ideal is a
lattice and the decryption process entails solving a CVP in this private lattice. Moreover, we
show that the variance of the additive noise in this closest vector problem is small for an op-
timal decoder, like sphere decoder. Therefore, in the decryption process of our cryptosystem
with the presented parameter sets, a legitimate receiver using the private generator matrix,
solves CVP with affordable complexity and negligible error probability.
Due to the hybrid structure of the BQTRU lattice, recovering the private key in our
cryptosystem leads to solving SVP in the expanded lattice which is at least (2+ log2 n) times
larger than the dimension of the NTRU lattice with equivalent parameters. This increasing
in the dimension of the lattice force a high cost to the attacker using a lattice attack in
this cryptosystem. As a result of this expansion, this cryptosystem achieves high security
against lattice attacks. Also we can reduce the size of the private keys without violating
the system security and use larger message. Hence, message protection is feasible through
larger polynomials increasing message security.
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